The Russian Embargo: The Economic Impact On Italian Sectors.Author’s Details.

Author(s)

Carmelo Intrisano , Anna Paola Micheli ,

Download Full PDF Pages: 44-57 | Views: 393 | Downloads: 113 | DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.3460293

Volume 4 - July 2015 (07)

Abstract

The paper analyzes the effects of the embargo in relation to the trade blockade, on a list of products referred to Resolution n.778 of 2014, imposed by the Russian Federation. The analysis uses the model of Leontief to estimate the effects, taking on different scenarios: the first considers only the products listed in the embargo, the second assumes that the embargo is extended to textiles, clothing, footwear and technological products, a third scenario in which the blockade is extended to the entire production. 

Keywords

economic sanction, embargo, Italian sectors, international trade, economic impact.

References

  1. Allisson F., (2009), Reception of Walras‟ theory of exchange and theory of production in Russia. The History of Economic Thought n.51, pp 19-34.
  2. Agenzia ICE Mosca, Analisi congiunturale, ottobre 2014.
  3. Agenzia ICE Mosca, Fare affari in Russia, settembre 2014.
  4. Agenzia ICE Mosca, Misure restrittive Federazione Russa e Sanzioni Unione Europea, settembre 2014.
  5. Andreas P., (2005), Criminalizing Consequences of Sanctions: Embargo Busting and Its Legacy, International Studies Quarterly V. 49, Issue 2, pages 335–360
  6. Anthony I., (2002), Sanctions applied by the European Union and the United Nations, SIPRI Yearbook, Stockholm.
  7. Baldwin D. A., & Pape, R. A., ( 1998), Evaluating Economic Sanctions”, International Security, Vol. 23, No. 2. pp. 189- 198.
  8. Bank of Russia (2013) Financial market review. The first half of 2013. Bank of Russia research and information department.
  9. Baumol W. J. A., & Raa T. T., (2009), Wassily Leontief: in appreciation. European Journal of the History of Economic Thought n.16. pp 511-522.
  10. Bonetti S. (1991), Sanctions and Statistics: Reconsidering Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, University of St. Andrews Discussion Papers
  11. Caruso R., (2007), The Impact of International Economic Sanctions on Trade: An Empirical Analysis, Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy 9.2.
  12. Centro Studi Confindustria, Le sfide della politica economica, Scenari economici, settembre 2014, n. 21
  13. Cooper Drury A., ( 1998), Revisiting Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 35, No. 4., pp. 497-509.
  14. Cortright D.& Lopez, G. A. (2002), Smart Sanctions: Targeting Economic Statecraft,, Oxford: Rowan & Littlefield Publishers.
  15. Coulibaly B., (2005), Effects of Financial Autarky and Integration: The Case of the South Africa Embargo, International Finance Discussion Papers n. 839
  16. Davis L.& Engerman S. (2003), History Lessons: Sanctions: Neither War nor Peace”,The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 17, No. 2. pp. 187-197.
  17. Dietzenbacher E., & Lahr M. L., (2004), Wassily Leontief and input-output economics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
  18. Elliott K. A. (1998) The Sanctions Glass: Half Full or Completely Empty?”,International Security, Vol. 23, No. 1., pp. 50- 65.
  19. Hufbauer, G., Schott, J., Elliott, K., (1990), Economic Sanctions Reconsidered History and Current Policy vol.1-2, Institute for International Economics, Washington DC.
  20. Kryvoi Y. (2007), Why European Union Trade Sanctions Do Not Work, Harvard European Law Working Paper no 4/2007
  21. Gazzetta Ufficiale dell‟ Unione Europea, Regolamento (UE) n. 833/2014 del Consiglio, Luglio 2014.
  22. Gazzetta Ufficiale dell‟ Unione Europea, Regolamento (UE) n. 960/2014 del Consiglio, Settembre 2014.
  23. Haass N. & O‟Sullivan, ML., (2000) Honey and Vinegar: Incentives, Sanctions, and Foreign Policy, Washington, D.C.,Brookings
  24. Lacy, D., Niou, E.,( 2004) A Theory of Economic Sanctions and Issue Linkage: The Role of Preferences, Information, and Threats. The Journal of Politics 66(1), 25-42.
  25. Leontief W. (1986) Input-output economics, Oxford University Press, New York.
  26. Robert A. Pape (1997) Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work, International Security, Vol. 22, N. 2, pp. 90-136
  27. Mack A., & Khan A. (2000), The Efficacy of UN Sanctions, Security Dialogue, International Peace Research Institute, Oslo,.
  28. Hovi J., Huseby R., & Sprinz D. F (2005), When Do (Imposed) Economic Sanctions Work?, World Politics, Vol. 57, N. 4, pp. 479-499
  29. Hufbauer G. C., Schott J.J., Elliott K. A. (1990), Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: History and Current Policy, Institute of International Economics.
  30. Lopez,G. A.; Cortright, D. (1997) Financial Sanctions: The Key to a „Smart‟ Sanctions Strategy”, Die Friedens-Warte 72 , pp. 327-36
  31. Mack A.,& Khan A.,( 1992), The efficacy of UN sanctions. Security Dialogue 31, no. 3 (2000), p.282
  32. Martin, L. L. (1992), Coercive Cooperation: Explaining Multilateral Economic Sanctions”, Princeton: Princeton University Press
  33. Morgan, T. Clifton, and Anne C. Miers. (1999) When Threats Succeed: A Formal Model of the Threat and Use of Sanctions. Paper presented at the 1999 Annual Meeting of the Peace Science Society (International), Ann Arbor, MI,.
  34. Morgan C. T.; Schwebach, V. L. (1997), Fools Suffer Gladly: The Use of Economic Sanctions in International Crises International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 41, No. 1., pp. 27-50.
  35. Pape R. A. (1997),Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work”, International Security, Vol. 22, No. 2., pp. 90-136.
  36. Pape R. A. (1998) Why Economic Sanctions Still Do Not Work”, International Security, Vol. 23, No. 1., pp. 66-77.
  37. Parker,R.W., (2000), The problem with scorecards:How and how not to measure the cost- effectiveness of economic sanction, Michigan Journal of International Law.
  38. The World Bank, Russian Federation Country Profile, 2012.
  39. SACE Europa- Russia: una Guerra commerciale alle porte? Ottobre 2014 SACE Sanzioni crescenti verso la Russia, Agosto 2014
  40. WeissT. G. (1999) Sanctions as a Foreign Policy Tool: Weighing Humanitarian Impulses”, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 36, No. 5, pp. 499-509.

Cite this Article: