Assessment of Corporate Governance on Earnings per Share of Selected Deposit Money Banks in Nigeria
Author(s)
Akinlabi, Babatunde H , Owolabi, Sunday A , Cole, Abimbola Ayodeji ,
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Abstract
The study assessed the relationship between corporate governance and earnings per share of selected deposit money banks in Nigeria from 2006 to 2018.Ex post facto research design was adopted for this study using secondary data obtained from published annual reports, returns of selected deposit money banks, statistical bulletin of the central Bank of Nigeria and data obtained from the National Bureau of Statistics. Data obtained were analysed using Regression analysis with the aid of SPSS and E-view.Results obtained showed that corporate governance represented by board independence (BI), organizational orientation (OO), risk management structure (RMS), ownership structure (OS), transparency and disclosure (TD) have a positive relationship with earnings per share (EPS) on listed deposit money banks (DMBs) in Nigeria.
Keywords
Corporate governance, Earnings per share, Financial Performance
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