Literature Review Loan Default in Peer To Peer Lending

Author(s)

Thu Trang Dang , Thi Thu Ha Pham , Thi Nguyet Doan ,

Download Full PDF Pages: 106-118 | Views: 536 | Downloads: 168 | DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.5036234

Volume 9 - November 2020 (11)

Abstract

P2P lending is a relatively new way of facilitating money where individuals can lend money to or borrow from other individuals without the intervention of different financial intermediaries. A big disadvantage for the lender is the higher risk of information asymmetry. Information asymmetry makes it difficult for the lenders to assess the riskiness of the different borrowers, so a deep knowledge about the determinants of loan default can assist the lenders in making a more informed investing decision. This paper will study the different determinants of loan default and so help investors in making more informed investing decisions. .

Keywords

P2P, Loan default

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