An Investigation of Corporate Governance and Firm Performance after Revised Code 2012 in Pakistan
Author(s)
Shahbaz Tariq , Zeeshan Ur Rahman Awan , Raja Ased Azad Khan ,
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Abstract
this study aims to examine the impact of corporate governance on the performance of listed firms after the adoption of a revised code of corporate governance (CCG) 2012 in Pakistan as main objective and recommend suitable corporate governance practices for improving the performance of the listed organization. To attain these objectives, in this study use return on equity and return on assets, as the key variables that defined the performance of the firm. Moreover, Board size, Board meetings and audit committee of the organization are used as variables to measure the corporate governance, also company size and firm age used as moderating variables. The data is comprised of the top 100 listed companies as the sample size for the sample period of 2013-2015. The data will be collected by using the secondary sources. According to the analysis, constructs of corporate governance significantly impact on a firm’s performance, and board size has a positive impact on a firm’s performance. However, meeting frequency and audit committee size has no impact on a firm’s performance
Keywords
Corporate Governance, Performance, Analysis, Code of Corporate Governance Pakistan
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