The Impact of Transaction Attributes and Trust on Ex-post Opportunism

Author(s)

Tugba Gurcaylilar ,

Download Full PDF Pages: 39-44 | Views: 434 | Downloads: 98 | DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.3408123

Volume 2 - June 2013 (06)

Abstract

The aim of this study is to examine the impact of transaction cost variables (environmental uncertainty and transaction-specific investments) as well as trust as a relational safeguard mechanism on ex-post opportunistic behaviors in the relationships between tour operators and hotels. The data were collected from a field survey in the Turkish tourism industry. The data provide strong support for the transaction cost hypotheses and the role of trust on ex-post opportunism. The findings show that higher investments of hoteliers in transaction-specific assets are associated with increased risk of opportunism by the tour operators. Similarly, this study indicates that opportunistic actions increase with the unpredictability of environmental conditions. Furthermore the direct and indirect effects of trust are confirmed by the data. When trust moderates the influence of transaction cost variables it is observed that the positive effects of environmental uncertainty and transaction-specific investments are lower. Consequently, this study contributes to the literature by providing an opportunity to discuss both the direct effect and indirect effects of trust on ex-post opportunism. 

Keywords

Transaction, Attributes, Ex-post Opportunism

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