The Relationship Between Democracy And Revenue Of Budget

Author(s)

Ziari-Reza , Rahemi. Hilda ,

Download Full PDF Pages: 17-21 | Views: 474 | Downloads: 106 | DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.3412345

Volume 2 - July 2013 (07)

Abstract

Employing panel data method for 21 countries in three groups with high, average and low democracy index, in this article, we investigated the relationship between tax revenues and democracy index. Hence, by using annual data for 2006 to 2011, we estimate three models. Our estimates show the following results: In high democracy of countries, tax revenues have positive effect on democracy index. In mean democracy countries, tax revenues have positive effect on democracy index, as well as. But other revenues except tax have negative effect on democracy index. These results show citizens have power in decisions countries, if they pay tax to government. And finally, in low democracy of countries. Tax revenues have negative effect on democracy. This result is against of theory. Our interpretation of these results is that the government of such countries have so power and citizens have no interference in the affairs of the country.

Keywords

democracy index, tax revenue, government

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